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Edmonton, AB, CanadaA B S T R A C TThe challenge of implementing high-cost innovative technologies in
health care systems operating under signiﬁcant budgetary pressure
has led to a radical shift in the health technology reimbursement
landscape. New reimbursement strategies attempt to reduce the risk
of making the wrong decision, that is, paying for a technology that
is not good value for the health care system, while promoting the
adoption of innovative technologies into clinical practice. The remain-
ing risk, however, is not shared between the manufacturer and
the health care payer at the individual purchase level; it continues
to be passed from the manufacturer to the payer at the time of
purchase. In this article, we propose a health technology payment
strategy—technology leasing reimbursement scheme—that allows the
sharing of risk between the manufacturer and the payer: the replacing
of up-front payments with a stream of payments spread over theee front matter Copyright & 2014, International S
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reet, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2T4.expected duration of beneﬁt from the technology, subject to the
technology delivering the claimed health beneﬁt. Using trastu-
zumab (Herceptin) in early breast cancer as an exemplar technology,
we show how a technology leasing reimbursement scheme not only
reduces the total budgetary impact of the innovative technology but
also truly shares risk between the manufacturer and the health care
system, while reducing the value of further research and thus
promoting the rapid adoption of innovative technologies into clinical
practice.
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The challenge of implementing high-cost innovative technolo-
gies in health care systems operating under signiﬁcant budgetary
pressure has led to a radical shift in the health technology
reimbursement landscape. Where 10 years ago, the majority of
reimbursement decisions were either yes or no, with the occa-
sional special scheme for politically high-proﬁle technologies,
now decision makers are increasingly choosing from a menu of
reimbursement strategies, as illustrated in Figure 1 [1]. The
procedural justice considerations and efﬁcient operation of
health care systems mitigate against one-off reimbursement
schemes. A characteristic of all these reimbursement schemes
is that the risk associated with the uncertainty about the true
value of the technology is transferred from the manufacturer to
the health care payer at the time of purchase. Thus, the new
reimbursement strategies attempt to reduce the scale of the risk
of making the wrong decision, that is, paying for a technology
that is not good value for the health care system, primarily by
reducing the total budget impact or by creating an opportunity for
the development of additional information to inform futurereviews of the funding decision. A positive reimbursement
decision, however, still entails signiﬁcant risk and that risk is
not shared between the manufacturer and the health care payer
at the individual purchase level; it continues to be passed from
the manufacturer to the payer at the time of purchase.
In this article, we propose a health technology payment
strategy that allows the sharing of risk between the manufacturer
and the payer: the replacing of up-front payments with a stream
of payments spread over the expected duration of beneﬁt from
the technology, subject to the technology delivering the claimed
health beneﬁt. The article is structured as follows: The second
section brieﬂy reviews the history of innovative reimbursement
schemes—the so-called access with evidence development (AED)
and the move toward value-based pricing (VBP)—and discusses
the extent to which these address the problem of asymmetric
allocation of risk between the health care payer and the manu-
facturer. The third section describes the technology leasing
reimbursement strategy (TLRS) and the method used for calcu-
lating the lease payment. The fourth section applies the TLRS to
an exemplar cancer treatment, showing how the risk borne by
the payer is signiﬁcantly reduced and how this can facilitateociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
t of Emergency Medicine, 736 University Terrace, University of
Fig. 1 – Selected reimbursement strategies ordered according
to restrictiveness.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 3 8 – 4 4 4 439more rapid and broader patient access to new technologies by
changing the expected net present value of further research. The
ﬁfth section discusses the potential value of the TLRS in the
context of VBP [2].AED, VBP, and Uncertainty in the Evidence Base
Staﬁnski et al. [3] recently reviewed AED schemes. They observed
that although the problem that AEDs attempt to address has been
around for a long time, and that most developed health care
systems have been involved in at least one such scheme, there is
very little evidence to suggest that they are successful from the
health care payer perspective. As well as being of limited value
from the payer perspective [3,4], patient advocates and manu-
facturers complain that AEDs restrict access to effective therapies
and reduce the return on investment in developing new tech-
nologies, thus threatening future research and development.
VBP has been proposed as an alternative mechanism for
promoting the uptake of new technologies [5] that avoids the
delays associated with AED schemes. VBP, however, works by
identifying the price at which a technology is expected to be cost-
effective and although upward and downward price adjustments
based on observed effectiveness allow some longer term miti-
gation of the costs of uncertainty, the risk of nonreturn on
investment in the technology is transferred in its entirety to the
health care payer at the time of payment. Hence, VBP is at best a
weak policy instrument for addressing the uncertainty in the
evidence base for interventions requiring up-front investment.
Because the high levels of uncertainty in the evidence for
cost-effectiveness are typical for innovative technologies, a policy
response is required. “Only in Research” and “Only with
Research” AED schemes are the primary choices currently avail-
able to decision makers concerned about uncertainty. Hall et al.
[6] have shown that Only with Research schemes are extremely
inefﬁcient mechanisms for addressing uncertainty in the evi-
dence base because the value of the information produced will
typically be much less than the cost of the scheme unless the
degree of decision uncertainty or the budget impact of the
technology is small. Only in Research schemes in contrast are
more efﬁcient but are politically less acceptable because of their
effect on patient access to the technology. The current portfolio
of policy options for allowing access to potentially valuable but
highly uncertain technologies is likely to be either highly inefﬁ-
cient or highly unpopular. An alternative strategy that shared the
risk that is inherent in funding such technologies while allowing
prompt patient access would be useful.Technology Leasing Reimbursement Strategy
Industries in which reliability of delivery is highly important,
such as civil aviation, have developed payment mechanisms in
which the suppliers receive payment only for delivered outputs
rather than delivered technology [7]. For example, airlines buy
ﬂying time from aero engine manufacturers rather than engines
per se [8]. When engines need maintenance or repair, a replace-
ment engine is provided to maximize the time that the airline is
in the air and minimize the risk that the airline fails to deliver
scheduled ﬂights. By leasing a working engine rather than merely
paying for an engine, the airline pays only for what it receives.
Just as importantly, the manufacturer has a strong incentive to
provide surety of service because it is this service that is paid for
rather than the technology itself. Although airlines enjoy other
beneﬁts from leasing engines, the ability to link payment to
delivered beneﬁts commends the consideration of leasing as a
payment strategy for health care.
Although leasing is not unknown in health care, its use is
limited to the provision of technologies with very high up-front
costs that are used in the treatment of a large numbers of
patients, such as Di Vinci surgical robots and magnetic resonance
imaging scanners. The standard model in health care sees payers
purchasing health care rather than health. Although treatments
are not engines—we cannot return or reclaim a treatment already
provided—it is feasible for payers to reimburse manufacturers for
delivered healthy time rather than for the delivered technology.
To a degree this happens with chronic therapies such as statins
and beta blockers, where failure of the treatment (death) results
in stoppage of the payment stream. For many expensive tech-
nologies such as surgical implants and cancer drug treatments,
however, the link between health delivered and payment does
not exist at the individual patient level.
In the context of a value-based reimbursement decision using
a cost-effectiveness rubric, the question of cost-effectiveness
would be established in the same manner as now. Here, costs
and beneﬁts over time are assessed, and a judgment made.
Having established the price at which the technology is expected
to be cost-effective, the “lease” payment due for each period of
health delivered could be established by calculating a stream of
payments over the expected lifetime of the technology that has
the same expected net present value as the agreed price. Many
such streams are possible, and there are many dimensions in
which they might differ. These include whether the streams
allow the price paid to increase for inﬂation or not; whether they
limit payment to a ﬁxed period after the delivery; and, of course,
which measure of effectiveness is used to judge whether a
technology has delivered the promised effectiveness. This article
does not make speciﬁc recommendations about which types of
stream are relevant, but chooses a case in which the price paid
increases in line with discounting; that is, we assume that the
price paid is adjusted for inﬂation and the net present value of
each payment is equal. No time limit is set on the length of
the lease.
The TLRS would work by paying the company for each period
of health delivered at the individual patient level. If the observed
mean effectiveness was equal to the expected effectiveness, then
the manufacturer would receive the full value of the technology.
When an individual’s health experience from the technology was
less than predicted, the payment would stop and thus the health
care system would be to some degree protected from the risk of
paying for a technology that was not in fact good value for it.
Equally, if the observed effectiveness exceeded that expected in a
person, the company would continue to receive additional pay-
ments for them. To this extent, the TLRS at least partially
automates the VBP proposal that the price paid for a technology
Fig. 2 – Net beneﬁt probability map for a hypothetical innovative technology with cumulative net health beneﬁt (NHB)
measured in quality-adjusted life-years and the time horizon measured in years after treatment.
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as decrease in the presence of lower than expected beneﬁts,
while still respecting the cost-effectiveness threshold used by the
decision maker.
Figure 2 uses the net beneﬁt probability map (NBPM) [9] to
illustrate how the standard up-front payment mechanism for
nonchronic disease technologies transfers all the risk to the
health payer. The NBPM uses the simulation data generated for
standard probabilistic sensitivity analyses of a cost-effectiveness
analysis to describe the distribution of uncertainty in net beneﬁt
over time. The bold central line is the cumulative expected net
beneﬁt (net health beneﬁt, measured in quality-adjusted life-
years) over the time horizon of the cost-effectiveness analysis.
The dashed plots are probability contours plotting the deciles of
the cumulative net beneﬁt distribution at each time point.
By displaying the uncertainty around the expected net beneﬁt
over time, the NBPM allows decision makers to understand the
allocation of risk between the manufacturer and the health care
system. In Figure 2, we can see that the risk regarding whether a
new technology is good value is driven by uncertainty about
whether the new technology will deliver sufﬁcient additional
health gain to cover its excess cost. In this illustration, by
following the second and third deciles, we can see that there isFig. 3 – Cost-effectiveness acceptability curveapproximately a 31% chance that the treatment will have dis-
placed more health than it produced 20 years after it was paid for,
and because of the risk of late treatment-related adverse events,
this probability increases to 39% by 50 years.
On initial examination, the TLRS appears to be similar to other
well-established forms of patient access schemes, in which
reimbursement is linked to observed effectiveness, and in some
regards this is correct. The TLRS framework, however, allows the
formal identiﬁcation of the appropriate per period payment that
is consistent with the cost-effective utilization of the new
technology on the same basis as other technologies that are
reimbursed without a patient access scheme. Hence, it does not
represent an essentially arbitrary departure from the standard
reimbursement decision rules in the way that patient access
schemes do. Furthermore, in reducing the uncertainty in the
expected net beneﬁt from the technology, the TLRS sits in the
same framework as the value of information analyses propo-
sed to inform decisions about Only in Research and Only
with Research funding of new technologies. Speciﬁcally, it will
allow the identiﬁcation of technologies for which a TLRS will
allow full implementation in the health system when the
decision uncertainty otherwise indicated a “research only”
reimbursement.for trastuzumab in early breast cancer.
Fig. 4 – Net beneﬁt probability map under standard reimbursement strategy.
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costs and beneﬁts between the manufacturer and the health care
system, the next section examines the effect of adopting a TLRS
on payment for trastuzumab for early breast cancer using a
simpliﬁed version of a published trastuzumab cost-effectiveness
model [10].Applying the TLRS to trastuzumab
Figure 3 is the estimated cost-effectiveness acceptability curve
for trastuzumab in early breast cancer, based on the model
developed by Hall et al. [10]. Using Claxton et al’s estimate of
the UK National Health Service cost-effectiveness range thresh-
old [11,12], there is approximately a 50% chance that trastuzumab
displaces more health than it produces. The expected incremen-
tal cost-effectiveness ratio is £17,154 based on a drug cost of
£21,184 incurred in year 1.
Figure 4 plots the NBPM for trastuzumab, showing that it takes
19.5 years before the expected net health beneﬁt is positive
and that the 90% credible range for the cumulative net
beneﬁt at 50 years is 0.55 quality-adjusted life-years to þ0.76Fig. 5 – Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve for trastuzumab in
reimbursement strategy.quality-adjusted life-years. The uncertainty in the expected net
beneﬁt increases rapidly over the ﬁrst 10 years. After 10 years, it
increases but at a decreasing rate, until effectively stabilizing by
year 40.
Given the price of trastuzumab is £21,184, and an average
relapse-free survival period for a patient treated with trastuzu-
mab is 10 years according to the model, the annual equivalent
drug cost for trastuzumab is £2,118.4 compounded each year at
3.5%. This is paid up front each year for patients who have
remained in the relapse-free state (including those who develop
cardiac toxicities). Figure 5 plots the cost-effectiveness accept-
ability curve for trastuzumab under the TLRS. The probability
that trastuzumab displaces more health than it produces, using
the same threshold value estimated by Claxton et al. [5], is
slightly lower at approximately 48%.
Figure 6 plots the NBPM for trastuzumab under the TLRS. The
expected incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is £17,225, and the
expected net beneﬁt is positive after 6.5 years. The difference in
the estimated incremental cost-effectiveness ratio between the
standard and TLRS is due to sampling variation. By year 10, there
is an 80% probability that trastuzumab has generated more
health than it displaced. The proportion of the net beneﬁt mapearly breast cancer under a technology leasing
Fig. 6 – Net beneﬁt probability map under a Technology Leasing Reimbursement Strategy.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 3 8 – 4 4 4442that is below the break-even curve increases slightly after 25
years because of the possibility that trastuzumab is considerably
more effective than expected and thus the total health cost of
trastuzumab increases. The 90% credible range of the net beneﬁt
under the TLRS, however, is substantially reduced, with an upper
limit of þ0.56 and a lower limit of 0.39.Innovation and the TLRS
Innovative technologies either do things that have not been done
before or they do things in ways that have not been used before.
This novelty leads to large amounts of uncertainty and the risk
that health care payers may forego health to fund a new
technology and not receive sufﬁcient return on that investment
to justify the initial sacriﬁce. The increased certainty that comes
from experience is by deﬁnition not available. As Walker et al. [1]
demonstrate, when there is a high level of uncertainty about a
technology, it will sometimes be efﬁcient to delay reimbursement
to await further research even when the expected net health
beneﬁt is positive. Other things being equal, this leads to a
reduction in the likelihood of these treatments receiving funding,
which may stiﬂe future innovation in health care, with potential
negative implications for economic growth more generally.
The TLRS addresses this issue by directly modifying the level
of risk associated with purchasing an innovative technology. This
is in contrast to VBP scheme proposals that sought to modify the
value of health produced by innovative technologies. By replacing
a single up-front payment with a payment stream that has an
equivalent expected value conditional on delivery of promised
health gain, the risk inherent in purchasing new technologies is
reduced. The framework has the potential to deliver higher
payments if the technology outperforms expectations, by allow-
ing the stream of payments to continue beyond the time point at
which the target payment has been reached. By reducing the
decision uncertainty, the value to the health system of delaying
reimbursement to await more research is substantially reduced,
making it easier for innovative technologies to be implemented
quickly into a health care system. Although the expected total
budget impact for the technology is the same as under the
conventional payment framework, the initial budget impact isreduced and the value of the decision uncertainty is substantially
reduced because failure to deliver the expected health gain is
linked to reduced expenditure. The expectation of a lower
cumulative budget impact in the years shortly after investment
also leads to an earlier break-even point [9], that is, the time
when the intervention has produced more population health
than is displaced elsewhere in the health system to pay for it.
The TLRS reduces the total budgetary impact of the technol-
ogy in the presence of reduced effectiveness and hence the
expected cost of treatment failures. It correspondingly reduces
the value of further research at any given level of uncertainty
regarding effectiveness and safety. If the treatment proves to be
better than expected, the TLRS allows the manufacturer to
receive additional revenue. This, in turn, makes it more likely
that an innovative technology can be made available as per
licensed indication and outside of the context of further research.
For truly valuable technologies, the TLRS is a mechanism for
promoting their rapid uptake rather than an impediment akin to
AEDs, without transferring the entirety of the risk associated with
reimbursement to the health care system.
An obvious and potentially substantial disincentive for health
systems to engage with the TLRS approach is the potentially
substantial administrative cost associated with monitoring
patients’ outcomes in response to treatment. In our example,
some patients treated with trastuzumab might require monitor-
ing for 50 years, some 45 years longer than current practice. The
increasing use of electronic medical records to create routine
system-wide data sets, however, may make this a smaller
impediment than would previously have been the case. Addi-
tional costs associated with the operation of the scheme and the
responsibility for meeting them could be taken into account
within the lease agreement. For example, if a manufacturer
proposes that a TLRS be used to make a technology available
that had been refused reimbursement under standard criteria,
these costs would have to be factored into the analysis that
established the price at which the technology was good value. In
contrast, if the reimbursement authority wished to use a TLRS for
a technology that met the criteria for reimbursement under
standard conditions (perhaps because of greater than normal
uncertainty), it seems likely that the payer should bear the
transaction costs. Under such circumstances, the TLRS should
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uncertainty such as reimbursement for research purposes on
efﬁciency grounds.
In the airline industry example that motivated our article, it is
incumbent on the airline to adhere to certain processes that
promote the reliability of the engines, most notably returning
engines for services in line with a speciﬁed program. Airlines that
fail to adhere to these conditions should bear the excess cost
associated with reduced performance. Similarly, for patients who
did not adhere to treatment, or where the technology had not
been provided as part of the speciﬁed package of care, the
agreement would need to protect the manufacturer from resul-
tant losses. This may create pressure for patient contracts to
promote adherence, although in reality, health care payers bear
the costs of poor implementation and nonadherence under
current arrangements and thus there is no logical argument as
to why the changed relationship with the manufacturer should
change the relationship with the patient.
A parallel disadvantage for manufacturers is that streaming
the payments over a much longer time period would increase the
time-to-return on the research and development investments,
with implications for investments in developing future innovative
technologies. In principle, ﬁnancial instruments such as bonds
could be used to ameliorate some of these affects, but it is likely
that the supply of investment funds for health technologies would
be reduced to some degree. Against this concern must be balanced
the risks to the current model of health care funding in the absence
of innovative payment strategies and the value of increasing the
likelihood of market access at or close to licensing.
The consideration of the TLRS has focused implicitly on devel-
opments in the United Kingdom. This reﬂects the fact that
discussions on the implementation of the VBP and the formal-
ization of alternative reimbursement strategies are most advanced
there. Although we would argue that the direction of travel in many
countries is toward greater use of health technology appraisal and
cost-effectiveness analysis in reimbursement decision making [13],
the utility of the TLRS mechanism is not limited to such a setting.
As Jaroslowski and Toumi [14], among others, report, there is
widespread use of patient access schemes across Europe and North
America [3,15]. The TLRS provides a systematic framework for the
design of such schemes, allowing a consistency in patient access
strategies across technologies and patient groups, thus facilitating
procedural justice [16] in an area of reimbursement policy noted for
its inconsistency and the presence of ad hoc policymaking [3].Conclusions
Reimbursement authorities are under pressure to develop mecha-
nisms that support the adoption of expensive new technologies by
health care systems to complement the development of conditional
licensing by regulators [17,18]. In this article, we have described a
speciﬁc formulation of a payment-by-results patient access scheme,
the TLRS, that sits within the cost-effectiveness–based reimburse-
ment framework and is coherent with VBP and value of informa-
tion–based research prioritization decisions. The TLRS can enable
more rapid implementation of innovative new technologies in
health care systems at the same time as protecting health care
systems from the uncertainty inherent in such technologies. By
doing so it reduces the time taken for investments in new
technologies to break even from the health system perspective.
In managing risk at the individual unit of output, and calculat-
ing periodic payments based upon a target net present value for
the total revenue stream, TLRS approach is consistent with stand-
ard leasing arrangements. However, there are some superﬁcial
differences. For example, conventional leasing schemes seek to
ensure continuity of service by ensuring replacement of technologyin the case of failure. For many individual health care treatments,
this is not possible. Instead the payment for the technology ceases
to ensure it is available to provide alternative health care. This may
be for the same patient or it may be other patients served by the
same health care budget. The principle of protecting against loss of
health production from the expenditure is parallel but not identical
to protecting against loss of services such as ﬂying time in other
leasing environments. In addition, standard leasing arrangements
are for a ﬁnite period. As described here, the TLRS does not have a
ﬁnite length. It would be perfectly possible for the TLRS to have the
duration set equal to the period used to calculate the payment.
However, this would close down the option of additional reward
for treatments that are better than expected.
The effect of utilizing a TLRS will vary systematically between
technologies. Technologies with a large upfront cost and few
downstream expenses, such as prostheses and implants with or
without biologically active components, would likely see the
largest impact. The impact would also be modiﬁed according to
the degree of uncertainty in the evidence base, the duration of
each payment period and the number of periods over which the
full beneﬁt of the therapy was expected to be observed. Lower
cost chronic treatments that could be self-administered by the
patients are unlikely to be appropriate technologies for reimburs-
ing through TLRS.
The TLRS ﬁts into the current portfolio of reimbursement
policy tools. The TLRS would take the cost-effective price deter-
mined through a VBP assessment. When the extent of decision
uncertainty is large, a TLRS strategy may not reduce the value of
further research sufﬁciently to support a positive reimbursement
decision. In such circumstances “Only in Research”would remain
the efﬁcient reimbursement policy option.
There may be concern that TLRS commits payers future
budgets thus reducing future ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. However, the
degree of future commitment will depend upon whether the
funded technologies deliver the claimed value. At a minimum,
TLRS’s will deliver greater ﬂexibility in the short- to mid-term;
potentially at the expense of less ﬂexibility in the future. How-
ever, that lack of ﬂexibility will be due to investment in tech-
nologies of proven value, in the same way as employing
physicians and building hospitals tends to commit payers’
budgets in the longer term. It is not obvious why long-term
commitments to invest in therapies should be judged differently
from other health care investments.
As a structured and consistent approach to the design of
patient access schemes for uncertain technologies, the TLRS has
the additional attraction of being more closely aligned with the
principles of accountability for reasonableness than the majority
of current processes for establishing such schemes [3,16].
Although the implementation of the TLRS will likely incur trans-
action costs, these can be incorporated into the analysis that
underpins the design of speciﬁc schemes and should not there-
fore represent an insurmountable barrier to its use.
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